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By  
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Introduction 
The last decade has shown that despite the efforts made to control river flooding for over a 
century (Vischer, 2003), Switzerland is not safe from the danger of flooding. The catastrophic 
floods of 1987, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2000 and 2005 in different regions of the country are only 
the most important national events and do not include localised events. These floods show 
how highly vulnerable Switzerland is to hydrological disasters. The cost of these disasters is 
more and more important due to the intensive land use and the sophistication of the property 
effected by flooding, especially in highly urbanised areas. In addition to the damage caused by 
the flooding and the consequent rebuilding, compensation and insurance processes, which 
follow, flooding also often leads to large-scale territorial changes (modification of property 
value, changes in territorial planning) and important changes in the organisation domain (for 
instance, structure modification in crisis management, institutional changes or the emergence 
of new actors). 
 
The floods of 1987 are considered to be the key-event that has changed the flood protection 
policy in Switzerland. For over a century, the Swiss federal state had organised the policy 
around two types of action: forest management in the high watersheds and dyke building – 
and other active protection infrastructures like dams – along the rivers and alpine torrents 
(Reynard et al., 2001; Vischer, 2003; Zaugg, 2002). The policy was a success and allowed the 
reconstruction of the alpine forests overexploited during the 19th century and the 
development of intensive agriculture along the valleys of the Alps and the Swiss Plateau. The 
floods that occurred in July and August 1987 in a large surface of Switzerland and that cut the 
international Gothard communication axe for several days showed, however, that the so-
called active measures (building) were not sufficient in order to reduce disasters due to intense 
flooding. A report on the floods’ causes and consequences (OFEE/SHGN, 1991) concluded 
that it was necessary to consider flood risk in an integral way, and that the active measures 
should be completed by passive measures aimed at preventing disasters (e.g. building 
forbidden in flood areas; danger maps) and managing the crisis when it occurs (e.g. crisis 
management, insurances). The importance of the integration of the territorial planning and 
flood protection policies was also recognised (OFEE/SHGN, 1991: 44). The conclusions of 
the report provoked a profound change in the philosophy of flood management in 
Switzerland, that aimed at giving more space for watercourses and their dynamics (Zaugg, 
2002) and at integrating the flood protection and territorial planning policies 
(ARE/OFEG/OFEFP, 2005).   
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One of the consequences of the 1987 floods – and other natural disasters that occurred in the 
following years –, is the creation in 1997 of the national platform on natural hazards 
(PLANAT) that aims in priority at the prevention of natural hazards in Switzerland. Its 
strategic objectives are to pass from a policy of mere defence against natural hazards to an 
integrative risk management policy. The platform has, therefore, adopted a global approach 
of risk, synthesised by a “risk cycle” model (see fig. 1 in Introduction) that was developed 
some years before by the Federal Office of Population Protection.  
 
This model has the advantage of being clear and easy to use by planners and risk managers. It 
is nevertheless quite simple and should be completed in order to take the actors and 
institutional configurations, and the temporal and spatial effects of floods and flood 
management actions more into account. Four key-elements should, therefore, be taken into 
account: 
• The model has been designed by and for risk managers (planners, engineers). It 
divides the actions made by professionals into several categories, but does not take 
into account the role of other actors like NGOs, the population, institutional actors 
of other administrative sectors, etc.  
• The model is considered as a road map for risk managers, but it does not take into 
account the fact that even in this group of actors, the knowledge of risk, natural 
processes and territorial elements is very different from one person to another.  
• The circular presentation of the model does not show the temporal characteristics of 
each element sufficiently: for example, the alert is reduced to a few minutes, whereas 
the preparation is a constant of risk management. 
• The spatial implications of each action are not taken into account. In particular, the 
model does not give any information concerning the scale (e.g. local, regional, 
national) of each element of the system.  
• Finally, the model does not take the institutional framework, that changes drastically 
according to the case (e.g. from one country to another one) and that constitutes the 
reference framework for the managers, sufficiently into account.   
 
Starting from these remarks, the aims of this paper are to define the “risk cycle” model, by 
taking into account the role of actors, their very different knowledge of risk and its 
management, as well as the spatial and temporal variability of their actions. The analysis is 
based on two case studies on floods occurred in Saillon (canton of Valais) in 2000 and Lully 
(canton of Geneva) in 2002 (November et al., 2006). Firstly, we present the two events, and 
then we analyse successively the risk knowledge by the actors, the information channels, and 
the territorial dynamics of risk (temporal and spatial implications of the events and their 
management).  
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The two floods 
Case 1: Saillon, 15-16 October 2000 
Saillon is a small commune (1700 inhabitants) situated in the Rhone River valley, between the 
towns of Sion and Martigny ( Figure 3-17). With regards to the floods the village may be 
divided in three parts: the medieval village built on a rock hill and surrounded by castle 
vestiges; the torrential fan of the Salentse river, an affluent of the Rhone river; and the alluvial 
plain of the Rhone river. New houses and commercial and industrial buildings have radically 
occupied this last sector during the last decades, mainly since the 1960s, which constitutes a 
general trend in the Rhone River valley (Stäuble and Reynard, 2005).  
 
The alluvial plain was drastically different in the 19th century. The Rhone River was still 
completely natural and alternated braided and meandering sectors. The trajectory of the river 
was guided by the presence of numerous alluvial fans of secondary rivers. Several depressions 
were characterised by wetlands and marshes due to damming by alluvial fans and hydrological 
connections with the Rhone River. The area of Saillon was one of these wet sectors and in the 
1850s, the river plain in that sector alternated wet meadows and alluvial forests. The Rhone 
River was then regulated in two steps, respectively in 1863-1894 and 1930-1960 (De Torrenté, 
1964). The meanders were reduced and the river was dyked. In 1873, the Valais government 
established a large project for wetlands reduction along the Rhone River valley, which was 
completed only after the Second World War. That allowed the important development of 
intensive agriculture, with cultures mainly situated below the level of the river, giving most of 
the area a feature of polder (Loup, 1965). Another consequence of the drainage works was 
the creation of several drainage channels connected with the Rhone River. 
 
These channels played an important role during the 2000 event. Between the 10th and the 
16th October 2000, intense precipitations coming from the Mediterranean Sea affected the 
South side of the Alps, and the maximal values were registered in the area of Simplon. The 
Rhone River watershed was heavily affected by the meteorological event, and the recurrence 
time of the high water is estimated to be 200-300 years in the area of Sion-Martigny (OFEG, 
2002). The 15th October in the afternoon, the dyke broke in the area of Riddes, some 
kilometres above Saillon. The water flooded first the plain situated above the Salentse alluvial 
fan (not visible on Figure 3-17), and then occupied two drainage channels. One of them 
broke on the evening of the 16th October and waters flooded 144 ha in the Saillon plain, 
causing damage of more than 25 million Swiss francs, and provoked the evacuation of about 
500 persons. 
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 Figure 3-17 Localisation of the two case studies. 
 
Case 2: Lully, 14-15 November 2002 
Lully is also a small village (1800 inhabitants) situated in the Geneva surroundings ( Figure 
3-17), on the commune of Bernex (9300 inhabitants). The village is situated in a depression of 
the Aire River plain. Until recently, the area was mainly used for agriculture (market 
gardening). As in the Saillon area, the plain was occupied by marshes until the 19th century 
and in 1907 a drainage plan was developed. The river itself was corrected respectively in 1888 
and between 1925 and 1933. The development of Lully initiated in the 1960s, and since the 
1980s, due to the intense urbanisation of the Geneva agglomeration, the village has grown 
drastically. The upper side of the Aire watershed is situated in France (St-Julien-en-Genevois), 
an area that has also been progressively urbanised.  
 
The flood of November 2002 was due to extreme precipitations (51 mm the 14th November; 
98 mm the 15th November). The precipitations caused the Aire flow’s growth – that did not 
break the dykes –, and intense runoff on the plain itself. The superficial runoff provoked the 
flood of the Bas-Lully sector that occurred during the night of 15th November. The flood did 
not provoke  any human losses – although several inhabitants were sleeping in the basements 
and were rescued just before the disaster –, but material damage were, like in Saillon, quite 
important (Figure 3-19). 
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Figure 3-18 Geographical sketch of the Saillon flood in October 2000 
 
The event was more tragic than in Saillon and large media coverage was given, especially 
because one year before, in autumn 2001, another flood had occurred and had affected 
houses that were under construction. Promoters and architects had assured at that time that 
the event was exceptional. After the 2002 event, some inhabitants, therefore, instituted an 
action in justice.         
 
Methods 
The study was divided in three parts. After the reconstruction of the event, by using scientific 
and technical reports, maps and some interviews with key-actors, we established a 
“cartography of the actors”. This first step allowed us to conclude that the number of actors 
involved in the event was quite large and concerned two main groups: the institutional actors 
– flood managers, planners, crisis managers, politics, etc. – and the non-institutional actors – 
NGOs, inhabitants, associations, fishermen, etc. We developed a comprehensive view of the 
collaboration networks – and also the gaps of collaboration – existing between actors. The 
scale of intervention (local, regional, federal) of each actor could also been established.  
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Figure 3-19 Map of the flooding event in Lully (15 November 2002) 
 
 
The second step was the undertaking of interviews with a selection of actors. 41 persons were 
interviewed. Each actor received guidelines, with a panel of questions, before the interview. 
The questions were organised according to 9 themes, covering two main areas: risk 
knowledge and territorial dynamics (Table 3-5). Each interview was recorded and the 
transcript noted.  
 
Table 3-5 The nine themes of interviews grouped in two categories, A = risk knowledge; B = territorial 
dynamics 
A 1 Role and knowledge of the interviewed person relating to the risk before and 
after the event?  
A 2 How does the interviewed actor define the risk? 
A 3 How was his/her risk knowledge gained? 
A 4 What are his/her collaboration networks in the domain of risk? 
A 5 Does the interviewed person have a global comprehension of the phenomenon? 
B 1 What are the various territorial dynamics at different scales? 
B 2 How do different heterogeneous territorial dynamics co-exist? 
B 3 What is the temporality of the territorial risk management? 
B 4 What is the spatiality of the territorial risk management? 
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We have then segmented each interview by using the 9 themes and merged all the paragraphs 
concerning each theme that was analysed separately. That allowed us to show the general 
lessons concerning each research question, and not only the information given by one specific 
actor on the event and the flood risk in general. The main findings are presented in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
The actors and their knowledge of risk 
The different actors (institutional and non institutional) have very different knowledge of 
hydrological risks. Their perception of phenomena is very heterogeneous. This conducts to a 
large panel of risk definitions. The “specialists” of territorial planning and hydraulic 
engineering refer generally to the definition adopted by the Swiss Federal Agency of 
Environment: risk = hazard x vulnerability. Most of them have good knowledge of the 
various processes that can cause a flood and of specific concepts used for defining the 
intensity of an event (e.g. recurrence time). During the interviews, they frequently illustrated 
their comments by examples from different parts of Switzerland in order to compare them 
with the specific studied cases (Lully, Saillon). Moreover, their definition generally refers to 
the notion of probability that may be used for quantifying the danger. The “non-specialists” 
– that is persons working in other administrative sectors, the local authorities (e.g. mayor) and 
the inhabitants – generally define the risk on the basis of the specific event or on their 
experience.   
 
We analysed the knowledge of hydrological risk in their area before the event. The result is 
that, as for the definition of risk, the knowledge was very different from one person to 
another. The actors could be divided in six specific groups ( Table 3 6). 
 
In the Valais, the specialists knew more about hydrological risks than those in Geneva. The 
farmers and old people generally had good knowledge of floods and their developments, 
based on their long experience of the area. All the other actors initially had very little 
knowledge of the risk. Moreover, most of the information that the actors had before the 
event concerned the hazard. Apart from the specialists of water management in Valais, the 
actors did not have a precise perception of the vulnerability. Their knowledge of risk – viewed 
as the combination of hazards and vulnerability – was, therefore, largely incomplete.  
On what do the actors base their knowledge? Two types of actors may be highlighted. The 
specialists of flood management have knowledge based on a large panel of sources and 
documents (models, simulations, historical information – former events –, administrative 
documents, experience), whereas farmers, old people and some actors at the local level (e.g. 
firemen) base their knowledge principally on their experience and field observation.    
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Table 3-6 Forms of knowledge before the events 
Group of actors Knowledge 
 Lully / Geneva Saillon / Valais 
Canton administration (actors 
working in the domain of 
water management) 
Few and fragmented 
knowledge 
Precise knowledge concerning 
hazards due to the Rhone 
River 
Canton administration (other 
sectors) 
No or incomplete knowledge 
 
Basic knowledge 
Local administration Very few knowledge Very few knowledge 
concerning the Rhone River 
hazards 
Firemen Reduced knowledge Knowledge concerning the 
potential break of a dyke 
Inhabitants Few and fragmented 
knowledge. Exception: old 
people 
Few and fragmented 
knowledge. Exception: old 
people 
Farmers Precise knowledge concerning 
runoff hazards and the initial 
state of the plain 
Precise knowledge concerning 
the Rhone River floods and 
the initial state of the plain 
 
 
Finally, as for knowledge in general, the memory of risk – that is the knowledge of former 
events and geographical indications that record the hazard – varies dramatically according to 
the actors. There is, therefore, cohabitation between very different levels of risk knowledge 
and memory in a small space. We can conclude that neither Saillon nor Lully has a collective 
risk memory as other vulnerable regions have.    
 
In the two cases the event has provoked a profound change of the knowledge of risk. We 
have identified four types of changes: 
 
• Radical change of knowledge (e.g. people who initially thought that their region could 
not be flooded); 
• Creation of new knowledge (e.g. discovery that flood could be provoked by runoff 
and not only by the Aire river in the Lully area): 
• Adaptation of existing knowledge (e.g. level of flood that was underestimated); 
• Confirmation of existing knowledge (e.g. bad state of the Rhone river dykes). 
 
These four types of changes concern the various groups of actors differently. Some of them 
(inhabitants, local administrations, non-specialised administration in Geneva) change their 
knowledge radically. For other actors (e.g. specialists of river management), the event 
confirms existing knowledge and allows the adaptation and perfection of previous practices.  
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Concerning the basis of knowledge, after the event, all the actors are confronted with a 
diversification of their sources of knowledge. Because of their responsibility in case of 
disasters, the local political authorities form the group that changes its sources of knowledge 
the most radically. The event has shown a profound gap in the knowledge, and in the two 
cases, the local administration has launched scientific studies (e.g. hazard maps) in order to 
define the knowledge on the hazards.  
 
The event has also had an impact on the perception of risk. In general, the sensibility to the 
hydrological risk has been reinforced in the two cases. The transformation of perception is 
mainly visible within the inhabitants. In Lully, several of them have been shocked by the 
event and some suffer from anxious states, especially in the case of bad weather. Several have 
taken individual measures in order to mitigate the vulnerability (e.g changes in the 
surroundings of their house, like small dams, in order to stop or change the course of the 
flood). The population in general seems to feel more concerned with flood risk issues.   
   
Actor networks and information 
Several interviews have shown that some problems during the event, concerning crisis 
management, were due to a bad circulation of information and collaboration between some 
groups of actors. We have, therefore, tried to understand how the information circulates 
between the different groups of actors.   
A first conclusion concerns the diffusion of information within the administration. The 
different services are at the same time producers of information (e.g. danger maps) and 
receivers. Within the administration the circulation of information tends to follow hierarchical 
channels, instead of transversal (from one service to another one) directions, and bridges to 
facilitate the circulation of information between specialised services and offices are sometimes 
lacking. The fact that the hazard map of Lully existed since 2000, but was not integrated by 
the territorial planning and urbanism services, is an example of this type of gap.  
 
A similar comment may be made concerning the relationships between the local 
administrations (communes) and the higher level (canton). The local authorities may be 
considered as generalists. Because of the small size of their administration, they generally do 
not have the possibility of specialising themselves on some sectors of territorial management 
and planning. Due to the large amount of tasks and to their incomplete knowledge of risk, 
this group of actors has a tendency to reduce the potential of risk. They, therefore, need 
impulsions coming from “above” in order to adapt their knowledge and preparedness. At the 
local level, we have observed that the event has launched an important re-organisation of the 
actor network. 
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In Saillon, the flood showed that the commune was not sufficiently prepared to the crisis 
management. Several actors had more than one important task (e.g. the commune technician 
was also the firemen chief at the same time) and the crisis roadmap was imprecise. A new 
crisis management task force was, therefore, created. In Lully, some inhabitants had the 
impression of being too weak actors and decided to create an association of inhabitants that is 
now an important actor involved in all the decisions concerning the territory and aspects of 
living in Lully (for more details see November et al., 2007).  
 
Finally, the two events have shown the importance of the rapid diffusion of information 
before and during the event. The alert needs, nevertheless, a complex chain of information 
between specialised sectors (meteorology, hydrology, dam management), and that is the 
reason for the creation or reinforcement of specific alert systems that facilitate the decisions 
when an alert should be launched.       
 
Territorial dynamics 
A first conclusion concerning the spatiality of hydrological risks is the absence (or reduction) 
of a territorial memory. Some actors (old people, farmers) still have good knowledge of the 
territory, but they generally are not key actors in the territorial planning and risk mitigation 
projects. The majority of actors (administrations, inhabitants) do not have a sufficiently 
precise knowledge and memory of their territory. Nevertheless, several types of indices 
(toponymy, micro-topography, archives, historical maps) of risks exist – the so-called “grips”, 
see November et al. 2005 –, and could be activated for managing the risk.  
 
A second conclusion concerns the development of passive protection measures. The 
measures proposed by the specialists (e.g. hazard maps, creation of surfaces for natural 
processes) oppose themselves to the interests of the economy, the urbanisation and the land 
and house owners themselves. There is, therefore, a trend to reduce the memory of the events 
and to mitigate the importance of measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability (e.g. definition 
of zones with building restrictions or no building allowed). This trend is reinforced by two 
tendencies: the first one concerns the probability that a new catastrophic event might occur; 
the second concerns the scale of the event (local versus global). Concerning the temporal 
aspect, there is a general view that if a catastrophic event has occurred, there is a low 
probability that a similar event may occur in the next years. The spatial considerations relate 
to the Global Change: we observe a type of fatality related to Global Change, on which it is 
difficult to act individually. The two tendencies have the effect of reducing the perception of 
a high potential of risk.   
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Conclusions 
In this study we have analysed how different groups of actors perceive and define the flood 
risk, which knowledge they have concerning hydrological hazards, vulnerability and risk, and 
how they act in a situation of risk, when an intense meteorological and hydrological event 
takes place. We can conclude that different forms of knowledge are used. Some, that we can 
call “vernacular”, are based on personal experience and territorial observation and memory, 
and concern principally the inhabitants that have lived for a long time in the area and the 
farmers. Others are more technical and scientific and are activated by the professionals of risk 
(engineers, planners, firemen). These two forms of knowledge – vernacular and scientific – 
are created and/or activated during the various phases of the “risk cycle” (identification of 
risk, preparedness, recondition). Both constitute “grips” (November et al., 2005), that is 
indices, visible in the landscape or on various types of documents that the actors can draw 
upon to anticipate the disaster and prepare good methods of mitigating it. Also during the 
crisis management phase the knowledge of risk by the different actors may be crucial: a 
wrong interpretation of the situation may incur more damage.   
 
The precise study of two cases has shown that several groups of actors – both institutional 
and non-institutional – do not know these “grips” and had very imprecise knowledge of 
hazard, vulnerability and risk before the event. The disaster has launched more or less deep 
changes in the perception and knowledge of risk by the various groups of actors. 
Comparatively to the situation before the event, the common knowledge is more precise and 
homogeneous after the disaster. This may be considered as the basis for a better integration 
between territorial planning, whose principal aim is the co-ordination of heterogeneous 
actions on a territory, and flood management strategies.  
 
Another important finding of this study concerns the circulation of information. The analysis 
has shown that in the two cases several gaps and problems concerned the circulation of 
information between institutional actors, both between several administrative sectors (e.g. 
urbanism and flood management) and levels (e.g. between communes and cantons). These 
problems occurred both before (e.g. absence of integration of hazard map information in 
local land planning documents) and during (e.g. alert information circulation) the event. They 
show the importance of transversal bridges (e.g. co-ordination strategies) between the 
different sectors of the administration. These bridges must be formally defined. Bridges and 
strategies for the circulation of information have also to be developed between the various 
hierarchical level of the administration, especially between the communal and cantonal levels.  
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Concerning the territorial dynamics created by a flooding event, the modifications are less 
important than the ones concerning risk knowledge and crisis management. Moreover, they 
are not direct: two factors participate in the weakening of the risk memory and the mitigation 
of the actors’ resolution to convert the risk reduction objectives into territorial planning 
measures. The first factor concerns the temporality of risk situation. The probability of a new 
event occurring is considered in the long term and a sort of weakening of the attention to the 
risk occurs.  
 
Moreover, if a long time passes without an important event the perception that a potential 
risk exists weakens. Finally, the extreme events, whose extension is difficult to model, are 
more or less considered as virtual phenomena and their perception is very much reduced. The 
second factor is the spatiality of risk. Each risk is anchored differently within a territory (some 
are localised, others are diffuse). Moreover, the risk may be perceived as covering very large 
areas – e.g. the World concerning risks related to Global Change –, and in this case some 
actors have the idea that it is possible to escape the risk. All these temporal and spatial 
features act as filters in the risk perception. The result is a reduction of the capacity to act 
(and to pay) to take rational passive measures – that very often are contrary to individual 
objectives – in order to mitigate the risk.  
 
Concerning the “risk cycle”, this study allows us to complete the model in order to improve 
its use in concrete situations. First of all, the model should take the actors better into account. 
As they are numerous and generally very heterogeneous, every action aimed at considering the 
risk in a global and integrative way, should begin with a “cartography of actors”. This initial 
step allows the listing of all the actors, institutional and non-institutional ones, and their 
respective relationships. It is also important to consider the actors’ knowledge on risk issues, 
in particular, on which basis their perception of the risk is built, and if their knowledge is 
based on experience and vernacular knowledge of the territory or on more scientific bases. 
Another issue concerns the activation of different forms of knowledge. “Grips” exist both in 
the territory (toponymy, geomorphological landforms, etc.) and in documents (archives, 
historical maps, etc.). Some actors activate them and others do not. One aim of every 
integrative study of risk should be to show what these “grips” are and to give skills to the 
actors for activating them when a situation of risk occurs.  
 
Moreover, the “risk cycle” model gives a view of the risk management that is too linear. The 
different actions (intervention, recondition, reconstruction, prevention and preparation) are 
presented as successive phases of a linear process. Our study shows, however, that the 
temporality of these actions is quite complex. Some are very short and localised in time (e.g. 
alert, rescue), whereas others are continuous tasks (e.g. preparation and prevention). There is 
no succession in time: the preparation may begin before technical prevention and planning 
measures have been taken. Moreover, in each of these phases, various temporalities may exist. 
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Our general conclusion is, therefore, that an “integrative actor analysis” is essential in every 
integrative and global study on risk mitigation. More in general, this study shows the 
pertinence and performance of social science studies in the domain of risk management.                
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